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Abstract 
The hypothesis that informal financial groups (IFGs) in Zaire are relatively homoge-
neous in terms of gender, occupation, and geographical proximity. A simultaneous equa-
tions model of IFGs, corrected for heteroscedasticity, was estimated. Membership homoge-
neity is significant in explaining variations in the characteristics of the organizational form 
of IFGs--size of membership, amount of funds mobilized, and engenderment of reciprocal 
obligations. 
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Introduction 
Informal finance in low-income countries has received increasing attention in recent 
years. The evidence from Africa--Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Somalia, and Zimba-
bwe--indicates vigorous and extensive savings activities in informal financial markets. In . 
Cameroon, for example, it has been estimated that informal financial groups (IFGs) provide 
27 percent of total credit to the financial sector, and account for more than one-half of total 
financial savings (Schrieder and Cuevas). Recent studies (Garson and Sonsola; Cuevas et 
al) have provided evidence of an active and highly monetized informal financial market in 
Zaire. 
Of the various forms of informal financial intermediaries identified in Zaire, IFGs 
play the most important role in mobilizing funds, and in providing credit and depository 
services to rural households. Each village has several IFGs, each of which mobilizes, on 
average, between 250 thousand and three million zaires (Z) ($500 to $6,000 U.S. dollars) 
a year. This represents about Z 30 thousand ($60 U.S. dollars) per group member, an 
amount equivalent to about 15 percent of gross household income (Cuevas et al). 
Rotating saving and credit associations (ROSCAs) are a common type of IFG found 
in Zaire. Members of ROSCAs make regular contributions to a fund which is then given, 
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in whole or in part, to each member in rotation (Ardender). The typical ROSCA consists 
of an organizer and a number of voluntary members. The rotation is determined by various 
means which include bidding and drawing of lots. Other criteria, such as seniority, are also 
considered. When the rotation is completed, the group may continue for another cycle 
unchanged, commence the rotation with changes in membership, or disband. The collection 
and disbursement of the contributions which make up the fund may occur daily, bi-weekly, 
monthly, or with some other agreed-upon frequency. 
In addition to ROSCAs, one finds in Zaire another type of IFG, the savings groups. 
Schrieder defines a savings group as "an association where a core of participants agree to 
save regularly on a contractual basis. The savings might be used for member and/or non-
member loans on a interest-earning or interest-free basis" (Schrieder, pp.60). The essential 
difference in the services provided by ROSCAs and savings groups is that the joint financial 
services of borrowing and saving do not occur simultaneously in savings groups. 
The importance and persistence of IFGs in Zaire and countries throughout the world, 
both developed and developing, have led many people to conclude that IFGs can serve as 
a project design standard to improve the operation of rural financial markets. Along this 
line, an idea that is gaining attention and being more extensively promoted by non-govern-
ment organizations and other development agencies is the "linkage" approach of Seibel. 
Seibel proposes that banks could expand rural lending by offering loans to groups organized 
in, or as, ROSCAs, or to existing ROSCAs. 
An attractive feature of group lending is that it reduces the risk of default through 
joint liability. However, the point that is so often missed is that joint liability, in itself, is 
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not sufficient reason for members in a group not to default. Group formation is not a 
simple process, and clearly requires a great deal of information on the members and 
potential members in a group. There is a need to understand the glue that keeps ROSCAs 
together before blindly adopting this particular organizational form. Further understanding 
of the dynamics of the group is necessary in any attempt at group lending, especially when 
the group is formed with the express purpose of obtaining loans from a formal financial 
institution. This point cannot be overstated. The extension of credit will change the nature 
of an IFG. "Hence, use of informal financial intermediaries as conduits of donor funds 
should be gauged very carefully against the possible damage to the roots of the system these 
linkages can entail" (Cuevas, p.12). 
This paper explores the hypothesis that IFGs in Zaire are customized to their 
membership, their needs and their distinctive attributes. Specifically, IFGs are relatively 
homogeneous in terms of gender, occupation, and geographical proximity. Membership 
homogeneity is significant in explaining variations in the characteristics of the organizational 
form of IFGs--size of membership, amount of funds mobilized, and engenderment of 
reciprocal obligations. 
Risk Management 
IFGs reduce transaction costs through risk management. Risk is managed by 
gathering information about the membership and through enforcement procedures. This 
contributes towards reducing the costs associated with moral hazard and adverse selection. 
In this research, information is proxied by gender composition of the membership, 
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occupational composition of the membership, geographical proximity of the membership and 
the number of years the IFG has been in existence. Homogeneity in membership with 
respect to gender, occupation, and geographical location implies greater availability of 
information. So too does the number of years an IFG has been in existence: the longer its 
life, the greater the amount and accuracy of information. The greater the information set, 
the greater is the level of trust and confidence within the membership that all contracts will 
be honored, thus lowering the transaction costs associated with sorting out moral hazard and 
adverse selection. 
The size of membership is a means of risk management. The smaller the member-
ship of the IFG, the greater is the accuracy and reliability of information, in part because 
the ability to assimilate it is limited. A member may know only a few other members well. 
As membership grows, information on other members may be collected from members in 
the IFG not well known to any particular member. The use of this "secondary" information 
may eventually lead to a loss of trust and confidence in the IFG. 
The value of information is higher in ROSCAs than in savings groups because of the 
contractual differences. ROSCAs require that each member trusts other members because 
the funds mobilized for each member depend upon other members fulfilling their obliga-
tions. In savings groups, members have an obligation to themselves to contribute to their 
own fund, at least with respect to the funds mobilized. 
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Size of Membership 
Close to 60 percent of IFGs had a membership of ten members or fewer, ROSCAs 
being generally smaller in size than savings groups (see Table 1). In fact, 75 percent of 
ROSCAs are of this size. Furthermore, nearly 40 percent of all ROSCAs had five or fewer 
members. The average membership size for all ROSCAs was 12 members, with a range of 
between two and 650. Bouman states that the classic ROSCA consists of not more than 
approximately 30 members (1989). The data for Zaire supports this conclusion. 
Table I: SIZE OF MEMBERSHIP BY TYPE OF IFG 
Type of Group 
ROSCA Savings Group Total 
Size of N 
Membership N % % N % 
0-5 Members 27 43.5 2 7.5 29 32.5 
6-10 Members 19 30.5 4 15.0 23 26.0 
11-20 Members 11 18.0 6 22.0 17 19.0 
Greater than 20 
Members 5 8.0 15 55.5 20 22.5 
Total 62 100.0 27 100.0 89 100.0 
Source: OSU/SEP Survey, 1989. 
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In contrast, 85 percent of all savings groups have more than ten members. Over half 
of all savings groups have a membership exceeding 20 members. The average membership 
size for all savings groups is 58 members, with a range between five and 152 members. 
There are a number of reasons for the differences in membership size between 
ROSCAs and savings groups: the operational objectives of the IFG, transaction costs, 
different informational needs, and income levels of members of the IFGs. 
Gender Composition of the Membership 
Single gender IFGs comprise 54 percent of all IFGs (see Table 2). This is almost 
equally divided between all male or all female IFGs. Single gender ROSCAs comprise 61 
percent of all ROSCAs. All-female ROSCAs account for 37 percent of all ROSCAs. 
IFGs that are heterogenous with respect to gender composition are generally male 
dominated. Over 60 percent of mixed gender IFGs have a male majority. More than 60 
percent of savings groups are heterogeneous with respect to gender; for ROSCAs the 
equivalent figure is 41 percent. This suggests that there is a relationship between the type 
of IFG and its composition by gender. 
In fact, in IFGs with a membership of 10 or less, 73 percent are either all men or all 
women, a finding that strongly suggests the existence of sharp differences between the sexes 
on the subject of money (see Table 3). 
There are distinct differences in roles of men and women in the rural economy. For 
example, cassava production and sales are generally the domain of women as well as their 
major source of cash income; their contributions to IFGs depend heavily on this activity. 
.• 
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Table II: GENDER COMPOSITION OF THE MEMBERSHIP BY 
TYPE OF IFG 
Type of Group 
ROSCA Savings Group Total 
Gender N % N % N % 
Composition 
All Female 23 37.0 2 7.6 25 28.5 
All Male 15 24.0 8 30.8 23 26.0 
Mixed, Majority Female 
7 11.5 8 30.8 15 17.0 
Mixed, Majority Male 
17 27.5 8 30.8 25 28.5 
Total 62 100.0 26 100.0 88 100.0 
Source: OSU /SEP Survey, 1989. 
In general, because cassava can be harvested at any time, women are thought to enjoy a 
steadier flow of income than do men. Another interesting finding is that two-thirds of IFGs 
with a male majority have a membership that is three-quarters male. In comparison, only 
40 percent of IFGs with a female majority are at least 75 percent female. 
This sharp separation by gender is also an indication that the degree of trustworthi-
ness is stronger among individuals of the same sex. It can also be argued that this repre-
sents social boundaries in money matters. 
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Table III: GENDER COMPOSITION OF IFGS BY SIZE OF MEM-
BERSHIP 
Size of Membership 
Gender 0-5 Members 6-10 Members 11-20 >20 
Members Members 
All Female 
14 6 1 4 
All Male 11 8 2 2 
Mixed, Majority 
Female 
2 2 5 6 
Mixed, Majority 
Male 
2 7 9 7 
Total 29 23 17 19 
Source: OSU /SEP Survey, 1989. 
Length of Existence1 
Total 
25 
23 
15 
25 
88 
Sixty-four percent of all IFGs were formed after 1987 (see table 4 ). However, it is 
interesting to note the existence of IFGs prior to 1980. Over seventy percent of all ROSCAs 
were formed between 1988 and 1989 and one-half were formed during 1989. Savings groups 
appear more stable, one-half having been in existence since before 1988. 
1 The definition of a "new" IFG is rather subjective. There is the possibility of adding 
or losing members in ROSCAs after the completion of a rotation. Hence, the next 
rotation could be treated as a continuation of the previous ROSCA or as a "new" 
ROSCA. 
9 
Table IV: NUMBER OF YEARS AN IFG HAS EXISTED BY TYPE 
OFIFG 
Type of Group 
ROSCA Savings Group Total 
Number of N % N % N % 
Years 
One Year 31 51.5 5 18.5 36 41.5 
Two Years 12 20.0 8 29.5 20 23.0 
Three Years 6 10.0 1 3.5 7 8.0 
Four-Five Years 3 5.0 4 15.0 7 8.0 
>Five Years 8 13.5 9 33.5 17 19.5 
Total 60 100.0 27 100.0 87 100.0 
Source: OSU /SEP Survey, 1989. 
The apparent instability of IFGs--65 percent of all IFGs were formed after 1987--is 
complicated by the finding that this apparent instability is primarily caused by the migration 
of members to other villages. There are only occasional cases of fraud or theft. Fraud and 
theft do not occur in IFGs to the extent imagined by many people, including the people who 
are now members of IFGs. In Bandundu, only ten percent of members who had previously 
participated in IFGs have withdrawn because of fraud or theft. In Shaba, migration was 
found to be as important a reason for the withdrawal of members as fraud or theft. 
Every member of an IFG joins the group with certain objectives in mind. The 
apparent instability of IFGs may be attributed to the major objectives of its membership. 
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According to the leaders of IFGs, reciprocal obligations in the form of mutual aid is the 
benefit being sought most by members. As stated earlier, the engenderment of reciprocal 
obligations do not necessarily imply that all members will benefit equally at any particular 
time. It is logical to assume that reciprocal obligations become a longer lasting feature of 
relationships among the members than the main output provided by IFGs, though this 
assumption deserves further investigation. The very definition of reciprocal obligations 
implies that the relationship will in all likelihood be long lasting, beyond the lifespan of the 
IFG. 
The length of time it takes to complete one rotation in an ROSCA is also important. 
With the average length of time to complete one rotation being approximately seven 
months, many ROSCAs may have completed at least three rotations in two years. 
Geographical Proximity of the Membership 
An important condition for membership in an IFG is residence in the village. In 
fact, the most commonly shared attribute of members, according to the leaders, is their 
place of residence (see Table 5). Only five of the 89 IFGs surveyed had members who lived 
in villages other than those of the IFGs' location. Supporting this finding is the fact that a 
majority of the IFGs surveyed have been founded by indigenous members of the local area. 
Occupation of the Membership 
An analysis of the occupations of members of IFGs reveals that IFGs are relatively 
homogenous with respect to occupation. IFGs have a membership that is homogenous in 
-· 
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Table V: COMMON BOND OF MEMBERSHIP BY TYPE OF IFG 
Type of Group 
ROSCA Savings Group Total 
Common Bond N % N % N % 
Community 27 43.5 6 23.0 33 37.5 
Occupation 18 29.0 7 27.0 25 28.4 
Ethniticity 8 13.0 4 15.5 12 13.6 
Gender 4 6.5 0 0.0 4 4.6 
Religion 0 0.0 5 19.0 5 5.7 
Other 5 8.0 4 15.5 9 10.2 
Total 62 100.0 26 100.0 88 100.0 
Source: OSU /SEP Survey, 1989. 
occupation in 43 of 76 groups. The percentage of ROSCAs whose members share the same 
occupation is similar to that in savings groups, 55 percent. In over three-quarters of all 
IFGs, at least 75 percent of the members have the same occupation. This suggests that 
there is a greater degree of trust and confidence among people of the same occupation. 
In addition, the occupational homogeneity of the membership is of great benefit in 
making key organizational decisions. For example, different occupations impose different 
constraints on their members. Thus an IFG that is homogeneous by occupation will not 
have to deal with constraints that act against one another. Yet, the degree of occupational 
homogeneity also affects cash flows within the membership: when members are of the same 
occupation, they experience similar cash flows. Occupational homogeneity itself can be a 
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constraint in times when the membership is faced with a similar hardship i.e. a drought for 
a membership comprised of farmers. 
The vast majority of IFGs have members engaged in farming. A greater percentage 
of IFGs, 30 percent, are comprised of women as compared to male farmers, 21 percent. A 
possible explanation is that women farmers grow cassava, which, given the fact that it can 
be harvested throughout the year, allows a more regular flow of income. Men, on the other 
hand, engage in farming cash crops that do not provide a regular flow of income. 
Empirical FindinKS for All IFGs 
Table 6 presents the estimates for the simultaneous equations model that describes 
the engenderment of reciprocal obligations, the size of membership, and the amount of 
funds mobilized for all IFGs. The overall effect of the exogenous variables is found in 
Table 7. Estimates for the simultaneous equations model, after substituting the ratio of 
women, and then men over total membership for the ratio of the dominant gender over 
total membership, is found in Tables 8 and 9 respectively. 
The Engenderment of Reciprocal Obligations 
The direct effects of information on the engenderment of reciprocal obligations were 
found to be significant for the proxy variables, dominant gender ratio and length of existence 
(see Table 6). Interestingly, the direct effect of the length of existence has a negative 
relationship with reciprocal obligations. The overall effect of the length of existence also 
has a negative relationship with the engenderment of reciprocal obligations (see Table 7). 
·-
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One possible explanation for this is the evolving information set. The longer the IFG has 
existed, the stronger the bonds of trust and mutual confidence within it. Reciprocal 
obligations become a part of their relationship, one that no longer needs to be mandated 
by the IFG. Also, once reciprocal obligations in the form of mutual aid are provided within 
the IFG, reciprocal obligations do not depend on the continuing existence of the IFG. 
The direct effect of the ratio of the dominant gender over total membership was 
found to be significant and had the expected sign in its relationship with the engenderment 
of reciprocal obligations. Reciprocal obligations are positively affected by homogeneous 
gender composition in IFGs. The overall impact of the ratio of the dominant gender over 
total membership on the engenderment of reciprocal obligations is also positive. 
Table 8 presents the system of equations that is estimated by substituting the ratio 
of women over total membership for the dominant gender ratio in IFGs. In this case, the 
more homogenous the IFG is with respect to women, the more likely the IFG is to engender 
reciprocal obligations. The overall effect of the ratio of women over total membership is 
also positive. One implication of this finding is the important role women play in long-term 
financial planning. This may be attributable to social tradition in Zaire: here women's 
incomes belong more to their families than do men's incomes. It is also possible that men 
are less capable of establishing among themselves that degree of trust and confidence which 
must exist for reciprocal obligations to take place within an IFG. 
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Table VI: ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE STRUCTURAL 
MODEL OF IFGS. GENDER REPRESENTED BY THE 
RATIO OF THE DOMINANT GENDER OVER TOTAL 
MEMBERS. 
Dependent variables 
Explanatory Reciprocity Membership Size Fund Size Variables 
RECIPROCITY na -o 0 56Wn -0.83 
(0.29) (0.54) 
MEMBERSHIP SIZE 0.1 na 1. 97" 
(0.14) (0.64) 
FUND SIZE -o. 0013""" 1.15 ...... na 
(0.0001) (0.70) 
INFORMATION 
--Gender 0. 06*** -0.75** 2.02* 
(Dominant) (0.042 (0.43) (0.822 
--Years -0.39 ** 0.25** -0. 44 * 
(0.29) (0.14) (0.202 
--occupation -0.03 -0.02 -0. 65 ** 
(0.03) (0.25) (0.34) 
PROCEDURES 
--Frequency of na -0. 79** 0. 75* 
Contribution (0.39) (0.292 
--Fixed vs na na 0. 64 ** 
Variable (0.46) 
Contribution 
--Emergency 1. 94*** -0.32 na 
Loans ( 1. 40) (0.43) 
TRANSACTION COSTS 
--Collection -o. 06** -0.11 -o. 25*** 
and Distribution (0.03) (0.18) (0.17) 
--Regulatory -0.01 0.02 -0.02 
Activity (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
--Type of -1. 50 -2.47"* 2. 28" 
Group (2.86) ( 1. 09 2 (0.53) 
--Income -0.0lE-06 -0. 54 ** 0.2 
(0.17E-06) (0.41) (0.19) 
--Region -4. 65*** na na 
(3.48) 
INTERCEPT 6.15 4. 28'"" -4.79 
( 8 .1) (2.41) (4.11) 
R-SQUARED 0.31 0.70 0.58 
na=not a licable· * Sl. nificant at C .01· ** si nif icant PP I g I g at 0.05; *** s 
icant at 0.1; standard error in parentheses. 
ignif-
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Table VII: PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE REDUCED FORM MODEL FOR 
ALLIFGS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES RECIPROCITY I MEMBERSHIP SIZE I 
INFORMATION 
Gender 0.01 -0.98 
(Dominant) 
Gender 1 -0.03 0.03 
(Male) 
Gender2 0.03 0.03 
(Female) 
Years -0.64 0.10 
Occupation -0.004 0.23 
PROCEDURES 
Frequency of -10.30 -0.23 
Contribution 
Fixed vs 12.12 -0.21 
variable 
Contribution 
Emergency 6.54 0.21 
Loans 
TRANSACTION COSTS 
Collection -0.15 0.23 
and 
Distribution 
Regulatory -0.09 0.02 
Activity 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Type of -18.40 -0.58 
Group 
Income -0.19E-05 0.10 
Region -5.54 -0.43 
INTERCEPT 24.43 I 4.11 I 
1 ratio of women over total members. 
2 ratio of men over total members. 
FUND SIZE 
-0.07 
0.05 
-0.03 
-0.16 
0.1 
0.47 
-0.1 
0.49 
0.25 
-0.0004 
1.48 
-0.16 
0.49 
0.70 
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Table VIII: PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL MODEL OF IFGS. 
GENDER REPRESENTED BY THE RATIO OF WOMEN OVER TOTAL 
MEMBERS 
Dependent Variables 
Explanatory Vari-
ables 
RECIPROCITY MEMBERSHIP SIZE FUND SIZE 
RECIPROCITY na -o. 72HK -1. S4K 
(0.33 (O.S4) 
MEMBERSHIP SIZE -0.06 na 2. S" 
(0.07) (0.77) 
FUND SIZE -o.0001s······ 0.73 na 
(0.00011) (0.66) 
INFORMATION 
--Gender o. 03*** o. as** -0.09* 
(Women) (0.02) (0.02) (0.031 
--Years -0.37 0.19 -0.SS 
(0.29) (O.lS) (0.21) 
--Occupation -0.03 -0.07 -0.98 
(0.03) (0.2S) (0.36) 
PROCEDURES 
--Frequency of na -o. so*** 0.23 
Contribution (0.32) (0.21) 
--Fixed vs na na 1.00* 
Variable (O.S7) 
Contribution 
--Emergency 3. as** -0.18 na 
Loans ( 1. 67) (0.44) 
TRANSACTION COSTS 
--Collection -o .os2*** -0.01 -0. 49** 
and (0.03) (0.17) (0.21) 
Distribution 
--Regulatory -0.0049 0.02 -0.01 
activity (O.OOS4) (0.02) (0.02) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
--Type of Group -4.74 -1. 94** 2. 26* 
(4.10) ( 1. 07) (O.S4) 
--Income 0.2E-OS -0.24 -0.09 
(0.32E-OS) (0.36) (0.22) 
--Region -7. 4 7** na na 
(3.83) 
INTERCEPT 17. 20"" 0.89 7. 9S" 
(7.38) ( 1. 78) (2.23) 
R-SQUARED 0.30 0.67 0.6S 
na=not applicable; * significant at 0.01; ** significant at O.OS; 
*** significant at 0.1; standard error in parentheses. 
·-
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Table IX: PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL MOD-
EL OF IFGS. GENDER REPRESENTED BY THE RATIO 
OF MEN OVER TOTAL MEMBERS. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
EXPLANATORY RECIPROCITY MEMBERSHIP SIZE FUND SIZE VARIABLES 
RECIPROCITY na -0.61"" -1.15" 
(0.34) (0.41) 
MEMBERSHIP SIZE 0.004 na 1. 77"" 
(0.07) (0.61) 
FUND SIZE -o. 0002··· o. 01 ····- na 
(0.00009) (0.52) 
INFORMATION 
--Gender -0.02 -0.02 -0.014 
(Men) (0.181 (0.021 (0.021 
--Years -0.49 ** 0. 22 ** -0.48 
(0.31) (0.15) ( o .101 
--Occupation -0.03 -0.21 -0. 62 ** 
(0.03) (0.31) (0.44) 
PROCEDURES 
--Frequency of na -0.52** 0. 42*** 
Contribution (0.27) (0.26) 
--Fixed vs na na 1.1 ** 
Variable (0.45) 
Contribution 
--Emergency 3. 64** -0.26 na 
Loans (1.76) (0.41) 
TRANSACTION COSTS 
--Collection -0. 68** 0.04 -o. 36** 
and Distribu- (0.032) (0.12) (0.20) 
tion 
--Regulatory -0.0043 0.02 -0.01 
activity (0.0058) (0.02) (0.02) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
--Type of Group -3.11 -2 .01 ** 1. 73* 
(3.32) (0.9) (0.45) 
--Income 0.29E-05 -0.3 0.13 
( 0. 311 (0.26) (0.2) 
--Region -7. 35 * na na 
(3.73) 
INTERCEPT 17. 49"" 1.42 5. 79"" 
(7.78) (l.77) (2.78) 
R-SQUARED 0.30 0.66 0.55 
na=not applicable; * significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; 
*** significant at 0.1; standard error in parentheses. 
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Table 9 presents the system of equations estimated by substituting the ratio of men 
over total membership for the dominant gender ratio in IFGs. This variable shows a 
negative relationship with the engenderment of reciprocal obligations, but it is statistically 
insignificant. The overall effect of the ratio of men over total membership on the engender-
ment of reciprocal obligations, through the joint dependence of the endogenous variables 
in the structural model, has a negative sign. 
The direct effect of the dominant occupational ratio on the engenderment of 
reciprocal obligations was found to be significant and negative in sign, contrary to our hy-
pothesis. The overall effect of the dominant occupational ratio is also negative in sign. This 
is the opposite of what was hypothesized. A possible explanation is that IFGs made-up of 
members of the same occupation face the same time-related cash flow constraints. Thus, 
there is little difference in the timing of members' cash flows to help meet unexpected 
emergencies. 
Size of Membership 
Table 6 presents the results of the size of membership equation. The direct effect 
of the ratio of the dominant gender over total membership is significant, has a negative 
relationship with the size of membership, and is not of the expected sign. The more 
homogeneous an IFG is with respect to gender, the smaller the size of membership. 
Differences between the gender ratios may explain why the relationship between the ratio 
of the dominant gender over total membership and size of membership in IFGs is not as 
hypothesized. 
-· 
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Table 8 contrasts the substitution of the ratio of women over total membership in 
IFGs with the ratio of the dominant gender over total membership. The higher the ratio 
of women over total membership in the IFG, the larger will be the size of membership. The 
total effect of the ratio of women has the same sign. In Zaire, women appear to work easily 
together: IFGs with a female majority appear to engender a greater trust and confidence 
among their membership. 
Table 9 presents the results of the size of membership equation by substituting the 
ratio of men over total membership for the ratio of the dominant gender over total member-
ship. The estimated coefficient for the ratio of men over total membership in IFGs was 
found to be negative, but insignificant in explaining the size of the IFG. 
The length of existence has a positive direct effect on the size of the IFG. The 
overall effect of the length of existence also has a positive relationship with the size of 
membership (see Table 7). The greater information set, available as a result of members' 
coexistence over a long period of time, would accommodate an increase in the size of 
membership without significantly changing the risk associated with the larger membership. 
The direct effect of the dominant occupational ratio is insignificant in explaining 
variations in the size of membership, and has an unexpected sign. The total effect of the 
dominant occupational ratio has the expected sign: the greater the dominant occupational 
ratio, the greater the size of membership. 
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Amount of Funds Mobilized 
Table 6 presents the results of the amount of funds mobilized equation. The 
information proxies were all significant. The direct effect of the ratio of the dominant 
gender over total membership is significant and has the expected relationship with the 
amount of funds mobilized: the more homogeneous the IFG is with respect to the dominant 
gender, the larger will be the amount of funds mobilized. Contrary to expectations, the total 
effect of the dominant gender ratio has a negative relationship with the amount of funds 
mobilized (see Table 7). The indirect effects outweigh the direct effect of the ratio of the 
dominant gender over total membership. Substituting the ratio of men over total member-
ship, and the ratio of women over total membership for the dominant gender ratio may offer 
some clues to the overall relationship of gender to amount of funds mobilized. 
Table 8 substitutes the ratio of women over total membership for the ratio of the 
dominant gender over total membership. The results show that the direct effect of the ratio 
of women over total membership on the amount of funds mobilized is negative. In other 
words, the greater the ratio of women over total membership, the smaller will be the 
amount of funds mobilized. In addition, the overall impact of the ratio of women on the 
size of funds mobilized is also negative. Thus, memberships whose composition is predomi-
nantly female affect the size of funds differently than do those dominated by males. This 
may possibly be due to the differences, in propensities for risk-taking, between men and 
women. Men in general tend to be less averse to taking risks than are women. The amount 
of funds to be mobilized is a means of managing risk. Moral hazard becomes more of an 
issue, the larger the amount of funds mobilized. By restricting the amount of funds mobi-
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lized, the IFG reduces risk in the form of moral hazard. Thus men may be more willing to 
mobilize a larger fund size. 
Table 9 presents the results of substituting the ratio of men over total membership 
for the ratio of the dominant gender over total membership in the amount of funds mobi-
lized equation. The direct effect of the ratio of men over total membership was found to 
be insignificant in explaining variations in the amount of funds mobilized and had a neativ e 
sign. The total effect though indicates that the ratio of men over total membership has a 
positive relationship with the amount of funds mobilized. Surprisingly, the direct effect 
of the length of existence has a negative relationship with the amount of the funds mobi-
lized. The total effect of the length of existence also has a negative sign. This may be 
attributed to the error in measurement of the length of existence variable. 
The ratio of the dominant occupation is significant, but has an unexpected sign: the 
more homogeneous the memberships' occupation, the smaller the amount of the fund. The 
indirect effect as captured through the joint dependency of the endogenous variables 
outweighs the direct effect. Therefore, the total effect is of the expected sign. 
Concluding Remarks 
By managing risk, IFGs reduce transaction costs associated with moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Risk is managed by gathering information about potential members, and 
through enforcement procedures. The composition of an IFG's membership, a proxy for 
information, is relatively homogeneous with respect to gender, occupation, and geographical 
location. This homogeneity implies a greater availability of information. The greater the 
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information, the greater the level of trust and confidence within the membership that all 
contracts will be honored. The size of membership, and size of funds mobilized are also 
means of risk management. 
In summary, IFGs are multi-functional, and reduce transaction costs through flexible 
operating procedures and risk management (Slover). The ability to adapt in order to cope 
with changing economic conditions, and to customize the IFG to fit the distinctive attributes 
of its membership make each IFG a unique organizational form. 
The findings reported here underscore the informational advantages that IFGs enjoy 
as compared to formal financial institutions. These informational advantages of IFGs 
manifest themselves as lower transaction costs, evidenced by the terms and conditions of 
outputs and services. There are, however, insurmountable difficulties in adapting the 
organizational forms of IFGs to formal financial intermediaries, given the institutional 
structure of the latter. 
Formal financial intermediaries could partially benefit from the IFGs' informational 
advantages through establishing financial relationships with informal groups. This integra-
tion between formal financial intermediaries and IFGs can be achieved by developing 
deposit instruments that meet the needs of informal groups, and through the provision of 
credit services to these groups. 
Access to the financial services offered by the formal financial intermediary should 
strengthen IFGs by increasing and improving the quality of their financial services, and by 
providing them with depository services. Lending to IFGs, on the other hand, may have the 
• 
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effect of lowering lending costs, and reducing the risk in the loan portfolios of formal 
financial institutions. 
In any attempt to organize groups as ROSCAs, it is vitally important to foster group 
homogeneity in gender, occupation, and geographical proximity. In other words, special 
attention should be given to understanding what glues the group together. 
Likewise, efforts to integrate existing IFGs with formal financial institutions will alter 
IFGs, and possibly threaten their integrity. 
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